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Abstract 
We document that accrual-based earnings management increased steadily from 1987 until 
the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, followed by a significant decline 
after the passage of SOX. Conversely, the level of real earnings management activities 
declined prior to SOX and increased significantly after the passage of SOX, suggesting 
that firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings management methods after the 
passage of SOX.  We also find evidence that the accrual-based earnings management 
activities were particularly high in the period immediately preceding SOX.  Consistent 
with these results, we find that firms that just achieved important earnings benchmarks 
used less accruals and more real earnings management after SOX when compared to 
similar firms before SOX. Finally, our analysis provides evidence that the increases in 
accrual-based earnings management in the period preceding SOX were concurrent with 
increases in the fraction of equity based compensation. 
 
 1
1. Introduction 
The recent wave of corporate governance failures has raised concerns about the 
integrity of the accounting information provided to investors and resulted in a drop in 
investor confidence (Jain, Kim and Rezaee, 2003; Rezaee and Jain, 2003; Rezaee, 2002).  
These failures were highly publicized and ultimately led to the passage of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX, July 30, 2002). The changes mandated by SOX were extensive, with 
President George W. Bush commenting that this Act constitutes “the most far-reaching 
reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt.”1  
Similarly, the head of the AICPA commented that SOX “contains some of the most far-
reaching changes that Congress has ever introduced to the business world”2 including an 
unprecedented shift in the regulation of corporate governance from the states to the 
federal government.3   
Although SOX proposed sweeping changes, the scope of the events that led to the 
passage of the act and the consequences of the resulting regulatory changes have yet to be 
systematically studied.  Specifically, it is unclear whether there really was a widespread 
breakdown of the reliability of financial reporting prior to the passage of SOX or whether 
the highly publicized scandals were isolated instances of individuals engaging in blatant 
financial manipulations. And if it were the former, how did the passage of SOX affect 
firms’ financial reporting practices?  Moreover, some argue that these frauds occurred 
after 70 years of ever increasing securities regulation, suggesting that more regulation 
may not be the answer (Ribstein, 2002).   
                                                 
1 Elizabeth Bumiller, “Bush Signs Bill aimed at Fraud in Corporations,” N.Y. Times, July 31, 2002. 
2 Barry C. Melancon, “A New Accounting Culture,” www.aicpa.org, September 4, 2002. 
3 Traditionally, the federal government has focused on regulating disclosure, public trading, and antitrust, 
while regulating corporate governance has been the focus of the states. 
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We investigate the prevalence of both accrual-based and real earnings management 
activities in the period leading to the passage of SOX and in the period following the 
passage of SOX.  Our primary motivation for conducting this analysis is to investigate 
whether the period leading to the passage of SOX was characterized by widespread 
increase in earnings management rather than by a few highly publicized events, and 
whether the passage of SOX resulted in a reduction in earnings management.   
We carry out our investigation by dividing the sample period into two time periods:  
the period prior to the passage of SOX (the pre-SOX period: 1987 through 2001), and the 
period after the passage of SOX (the post-SOX period: 2002 through 2005).  We further 
subdivide the pre-SOX period into two sub-periods: the period prior to the major 
corporate scandals (the pre-SCA period: 1987 through 1999) and the period immediately 
preceding the passage of SOX when the major scandals occurred (the SCA period: 2000 
and 2001).   
We document that the pre-SOX period was characterized by increasing accrual-based 
earnings management culminating in even larger increases in the SCA period but 
declining real earnings management.  We also document that the increase in accrual-
based earnings management in the SCA period was associated with a contemporaneous 
increase in equity based compensation, in particular, option-based compensation.   
Following the passage of SOX accrual-based earnings management declined 
significantly, while real earnings management increased significantly.  Consistent with 
the results of a recent survey by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), this suggests that 
firms switched to managing earnings using real methods, possibly because these 
techniques, while more costly, are likely to be harder to detect.    
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In additional analyses, we examine both the pre-SOX and post-SOX accrual-based 
and real earnings management activities for a subset of firms that are more likely to have 
managed earnings (we refer to these firms as the SUSPECT firms). Specifically, we 
examine three incentives for managing earnings, namely, meeting or beating last year’s 
earnings, meeting or beating the consensus analysts’ forecast and avoiding reporting 
losses. We focus on these incentives because Graham, et al. (2005) document that these 
specific motives are among the most important reasons for earnings management 
behavior.  
Consistent with our full sample results, we find that both before and after SOX, 
SUSPECT firms had significantly higher discretionary accruals when compared to firms 
that either just missed those benchmarks or firms that were not close to either making or 
missing those benchmarks.  However, these SUSPECT firms used significantly less 
income-increasing accrual-management after SOX when compared to firms in similar 
circumstances before SOX.  An analysis of the real earnings management behavior of 
these firms indicates that the SUSPECT firms had significantly higher real earnings 
management activities after SOX when compared to the firms in similar circumstances 
prior to SOX.  
Our results contribute to the current debate on the pervasiveness of earnings 
management prior to the passage of SOX, and the impact of SOX on such behavior.  
While we find an increase in accrual-based earnings management prior to SOX, our 
evidence suggests that firms are likely to have switched to earnings-management 
techniques that while more costly to shareholders, are harder to detect.  This evidence 
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forms an important consideration in the debate on the costs and benefits of the new 
regulation.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a discussion of 
the research questions and hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology, 
including the data and sample selection and the various measures of earnings 
management used in the study.  The tests and results are discussed in Section 4, and 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Motivation, Research Questions and Hypotheses   
In a recent commentary, US Treasury secretary Henry Paulson emphasized the 
importance of strong capital markets, and pointed out that capital markets rely on trust, 
and that trust is based on financial information presumed to be accurate and to reflect 
economic reality.4  The series of corporate scandals occurring in 2000-2001 eroded that 
trust in financial reports.  Indeed, one of the main objectives of SOX was to restore the 
integrity of financial statements by curbing earnings management and accounting fraud.  
Therefore, the extent of earnings management prior to SOX and the effect of SOX on 
earnings management is an important research topic.  
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the extent of earnings management in 
the period leading to the scandals and prior to SOX, and the changes in such activities 
after the passage of SOX.5  Our  examination of changes in firms’ earnings management 
activities is motivated in part by the literature documenting that managerial propensity to 
                                                 
4 Henry Paulson, “The Key Test of Accurate Financial Reporting is Trust,” Financial Times, May 17, 2007.  
5 In a related study, Lobo and Zhou (2006) investigate whether the SOX mandate that financial statements 
be certified by firms’ CEOs and CFOs resulted in an increase in the conservatism in financial reporting, 
and find evidence of greater conservatism in reported earnings. 
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manage earnings and to avoid negative earnings surprises has increased significantly over 
time (Brown, 2001; Bartov et. al., 2002; Lopez and Rees, 2001; Matsumoto, 2002; 
Brown and Caylor, 2003).  Our main objective is to examine whether the degree of 
earnings management increased over time and reached a zenith in the period surrounding 
the corporate accounting scandals, and declined after the passage of SOX.  
Consistent with the literature, we examine earnings management activities using 
discretionary accruals. However, in addition to using accrual-based accounting estimates 
and methods, firms are likely to employ real operational activities to manipulate earnings 
numbers as well (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000). In fact, in their survey Graham et al. (2005) report the following:6   
“… [W]e find strong evidence that managers take real economic actions to 
maintain accounting appearances. In particular, 80% of survey participants 
report that they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D, 
advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings target. More than half 
(55.3%) state that they would delay starting a new project to meet an 
earnings target, even if such a delay entailed a small sacrifice in value….”  
 
Thus, to provide a more complete study of the trends in earnings management activities 
in the periods before and after SOX, we also examine real earnings management 
activities over the sample period.   
Next, we examine possible explanations for any changes in earnings management 
activities over the sample period. We focus on the hypothesis that managers’ choices of 
accounting practices are influenced by the impact of these accounting methods on their 
compensation.  Managers with higher stock and option-based compensation are more 
sensitive to short-term stock prices, and can use their discretion to affect reported 
                                                 
6 In a recent working paper, Zang (2006) investigates whether managers use real and accrual manipulations 
in managing earnings as substitutes. Based on a model she develops, she provides evidence consistent with 
managers using real and accrual manipulations as substitutes. 
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earnings if capital markets have difficulty detecting earnings management (see Fields et 
al., 2001, for a discussion on the pricing of earnings management.)7  
Prior studies (e.g., Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser, and Philippon 
(2006)) provide evidence suggesting that equity incentives derived from stock-option 
compensation are positively associated with managements’ likelihood to engage in 
accrual-based earnings management activities.  However, Johnson, Ryan, and Tian, 
(2005) conclude that only unrestricted stock holdings are associated with the occurrence 
of accounting fraud, while the stock option grants are not, while Erickson, Hanlon, and 
Maydew (2006) find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are 
associated with fraud.  
In addition to equity-based compensation, executives are also rewarded based on 
explicit bonus-linked targets for reported income. Healy (1985) presents evidence that the 
accruals policies of managers are related to the non-linear incentives inherent in their 
bonus contracts.  Therefore, we investigate whether earnings-based compensation 
contracts are associated with earnings management.   
Our focus on the compensation structure is motivated by the current debate whether 
stock-based compensation and bonus grants are associated with earnings management. 
Further, there has been a significant increase in the grant of stock options in the past 
decade. We examine whether there is an increasing trend in bonus and option 
                                                 
7 For instance, Coffee (2003) asserts that the increase in stock-based executive compensation created an 
environment where managers became very sensitive to short-term stock performance. Greenspan (2002) 
opines that “the highly desirable spread of shareholding and options among business managers perversely 
created incentives to artificially inflate earnings to keep stock prices high and rising.”  Fuller and Jensen 
(2002, p. 42) also state that “[a]s stock options became an increasing part of executive compensation, and 
managers who made great fortunes on options became the stuff of legends, the preservation or 
enhancement of short-term stock prices became a personal (and damaging) priority for many CEOs and 
CFOs. High share prices and earnings multiples stoked already amply endowed managerial egos, and 
management teams proved reluctant to undermine their own stature by surrendering hard won records of 
quarter-over-quarter earnings growth.” 
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compensation particularly in the period leading to SOX, and whether that is related to the 
level of earnings management during that period.  
Specifically, our hypothesis that managers behave opportunistically due to 
compensation-related incentives has two empirical predictions.  First, changes in reported 
earnings are affected by changes in the compensation and incentives of managers. 
Second, even after controlling for managerial incentives, earnings management would 
decline after the passage of SOX, either because of the sanctions imposed on managers 
by SOX or because of the adverse publicity and legal costs imposed on executives and 
firms who were accused of fraudulent reporting practices.    
Our final objective is to investigate whether after the passage of SOX corporations 
replaced some accrual-based earnings management with real earnings management, 
which is harder to detect but also likely to be more costly to the firm (Graham et al., 
2005).8 Accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditor or regulator scrutiny than 
real operational decisions on production and pricing. If firms are more wary after the 
passage of SOX, then they are likely to engage in more real earnings management 
activities after SOX. This conjecture is also suggested by Graham et al. (2005):  
“… [W]e acknowledge that the aftermath of accounting scandals at Enron and 
WorldCom and the certification requirements imposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act may 
have changed managers’ preferences for the mix between taking accounting versus real 
actions to manage earnings.” 
 
Given the above argument, investigating the trends in both real and accrual-based 
earnings management after SOX is important. Evidence of a decline in one type of 
earnings management may lead one to conclude that such activities have decreased in 
                                                 
8 In their survey, Graham et al. report (page 66): “Managers candidly admit that they would take real 
economic actions such as delaying maintenance or advertising expenditure, and would even give up 
positive NPV projects, to meet short-term earnings benchmarks.” 
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response to regulators or other events, when in fact a substitution of one earnings 
management method for another has occurred. We thus hypothesize and test whether the 
level of real earnings management increased after the passage of SOX, i.e., whether firms 
substituted between real and accrual-based methods after SOX. The next section 
discusses the empirical methodology employed in the study.    
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
3.1 Data and Sample Description 
We collect our sample from the COMPUSTAT annual industrial and research files 
for the period 1987-2005.  We restrict our sample to all nonfinancial firms with available 
data, and require at least 8 observations in each 2-digit SIC grouping per year.  Further, 
we require that each firm-year observation has the data necessary to calculate the 
discretionary accruals metrics and real earnings management proxies we employ in our 
analysis.  This restriction likely introduces a survivorship bias into the sample resulting in 
the inclusion of larger and more successful firms.  We expect that this will reduce the 
variation in our earnings management metrics resulting in a more conservative test of our 
research questions.   
Following Collins and Hribar (2002), we use cash flows from operations obtained 
from the Statement of Cash Flows reported under the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 95 (SFAS No. 95, FASB 1987).9  The sample period of 1987-2005 permits 
us to use SFAS No. 95 statement of cash flow data to estimate accruals, rather than a 
balance sheet approach.  
                                                 
9 SFAS No. 95 requires firms to present a statement of cash flows for fiscal years ending after July 15, 
1988. Some firms early-adopted SFAS No. 95, so our sample begins in 1987. 
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The sample obtained from COMPUSTAT consists of 8,157 firms representing 87,217 
firm-year observations. To test the compensation hypothesis, we use data from 
ExecuComp, which is available only from 1992 onwards.  Thus, merging the full sample 
with ExecuComp results in a second (and smaller) sample consisting of 2,018 firms and 
31,668 firm-year observations (the ExecuComp sample) for the 1992 through 2005 
period.   
 
3.2 Event Periods 
We focus in our analysis on earnings management across two main time periods – the 
pre-SOX period (further classified into the pre-SCA and the SCA periods), and the post-
SOX period.  The pre-SOX period extends from 1987 through 2001, and the post-SOX 
period extends from 2002 through the end of 2005. Within the pre-SOX period, we 
classify the period from 1987 through 1999 as the pre-SCA period, and the period from 
2000 through 2001 as the SCA period (i.e., the period that purportedly lead to the passage 
of SOX).10  Figure 1 depicts these different time periods analyzed.11  
3.3 Earnings Management Metrics 
Accrual-based Earnings Management 
                                                 
10 We acknowledge that the subdivision into the pre-SCA and SCA periods may induce hindsight bias into 
the analysis. We thus repeat our analysis by only dividing the entire sample period into the pre-SOX and 
the post-SOX periods. Our conclusions on earnings management activities before and after SOX are 
unchanged and become stronger. We do not report these results in the paper for the sake of brevity, but will 
provide them upon request.  
11 The use of annual data determines how we subdivide the sample period to some extent. Although some 
scandals took place in the beginning of 2002, we include 2002 in the post-SOX period, since SOX was 
passed in 2002. Also, even though the most public phase of the scandals began with Enron in 2001, we 
include year 2000 in the SCA period since some frauds also occurred in 2000 (e.g., Xerox). Further, as a 
robustness check, we also repeat our analysis using quarterly data and subdivide the sample period using 
the “Corporate Scandal Sheet” developed by Forbes (Forbes 2002). Specifically, we define the SCA period 
as extending from Q3, 2001 through Q2, 2002, and the Post-SOX period as extending from Q3, 2002 
onwards. Our main conclusions remain unchanged, which provides added confidence in the results 
obtained using annual data. Finally, as suggested by the referee we repeat all analyses by defining the post-
SOX period as the years 2003 through 2005 and this did not materially alter any of our reported results.  
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We use a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals, where for each year we 
estimate the model for every industry classified by its 2-digit SIC code.  Thus, our 
approach partially controls for industry-wide changes in economic conditions that affect 
total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time (Kasznik, 1999; DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994). 12 
Our primary model is the modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones 1991) as 
described in Dechow et al. (1995).13  The modified Jones model is estimated for each 2 
digit SIC-year grouping as follows: 
 it
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where, for fiscal year t and firm i, TA represents total accruals defined as:  
TA it = EBXI it – CFO it, where EBXI is the earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (annual Compustat data item 123) and CFO is the operating cash 
flows (from continuing operations) taken from the statement of cash flows (annual 
Compustat data item 308 – annual Compustat data item 124), Assetit-1 represents total 
assets (annual Compustat data item 6), ΔREVit is the change in revenues (annual 
Compustat data item 12) from the preceding year and PPEit is the gross value of property, 
plant and equipment (annual Compustat data item 7).  
                                                 
12 We obtain qualitatively the same results when we use a time-series approach which assumes temporal 
stationarity of the parameters for each firm. 
13 A caveat: various studies in the literature raise the concern that discretionary accruals measured using the 
Jones model might be capturing nondiscretionary components, and these errors in discretionary accruals are 
likely to be correlated with stock prices and performance measures in general. While this concern is valid 
and we acknowledge this limitation in measuring discretionary accruals, note that we use discretionary 
accruals as a dependent variable and not as an explanatory variable. If indeed discretionary accruals are 
measured with error, the only consequence in our case will be a lower explanatory power of the model, i.e., 
we will obtain lower R-squares. Otherwise, using discretionary accruals measured using the Jones model as 
a dependent variable is not likely to introduce any bias in our results.   
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The coefficient estimates from equation (1) are used to estimate the firm-specific 
normal accruals (NA it) for our sample firms: 
 
1,
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where ΔARit is the change in accounts receivable (annual Compustat data item 2) from 
the preceding year.  Following the methodology used in the literature, we estimate the 
industry-specific regressions using the change in reported revenues, implicitly assuming 
no discretionary choices with respect to revenue recognition.  However, while computing 
the normal accruals, we adjust the reported revenues of the sample firms for the change in 
accounts receivable to capture any potential accounting discretion arising from credit 
sales. Our measure of discretionary accruals is the difference between total accruals and 
the fitted normal accruals, defined as DAit = (TA it / Assetit-1) – NA it.  
In contrast to studies that focus on a specific corporate event, our analysis using the 
full sample is conducted in calendar time.  Consequently, because accruals reverse over 
time and we cannot condition the analysis on events that are hypothesized to provide 
managers with incentives to manage reported earnings in any given direction (e.g., inflate 
reported earnings) we compute the absolute value of discretionary accruals to proxy for 
earnings management and refer to it as ABS_DA throughout the analysis.14  In contrast, 
our test of the SUSPECT firms (that is, firms that were just able to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks) is based on a directional test.    
In our robustness tests, we used two alternative measures of discretionary accruals. In 
one alternative measure we estimated the following in the first stage:  
                                                 
14 We repeat our analysis using the square of discretionary accruals and the results are somewhat stronger.  
Although the squared discretionary accruals have more desirable distributional properties, we report the 
results using the absolute values of discretionary accruals to allow comparison with other research.   
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Using the coefficient estimates obtained from (3), we calculated the level of normal 
accruals (NAit) as a percent of lagged total assets. We also repeat our tests by using a 
measure based on the performance-matched discretionary accruals advanced in Kothari 
Leone, and Wasley (2005).  As suggested by Kothari et al. (2005), we match each firm-
year observation with another from the same two-digit SIC code and year with the closest 
return on assets in the current year, ROAit (net income divided by total assets).15  Our 
results using these alternate measures of accruals are consistent with those reported in the 
paper.  
 
Real Earnings Management 
 We rely on prior studies to develop our proxies for real earnings management. As in 
Roychowdhury (2006) we consider the abnormal levels of cash flow from operations 
(CFO), discretionary expenses and production costs to study the level of real activities 
manipulations. Subsequent evidence in Zang (2006) and Gunny (2006) further increase 
our confidence in the empirical validity of these proxies. We focus on three manipulation 
methods and their impact on the above three variables: 
1. Acceleration of the timing of sales through increased price discounts or more lenient 
credit terms.  
2. Reporting of lower cost of goods sold through increased production. 
                                                 
15 We also carry out performance matching based on two-digit SIC code, year and ROA (both current ROA 
and lagged ROA) and obtain results similar to those reported in the paper.    
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3. Decreases in discretionary expenses which include advertising expense, research and 
development, and SG&A expenses. 
 We first generate the normal levels of CFO, discretionary expenses and production 
costs using the model developed by Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) as implemented 
in Roychowdhury (2006). We express normal CFO as a linear function of sales and 
change in sales. To estimate this model, we run the following cross-sectional regression 
for each industry and year: 
  it
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Abnormal CFO is actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO calculated using the 
estimated coefficient from (4).  
 Production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) and change in 
inventory during the year. We model COGS as a linear function of contemporaneous 
sales: 
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Next, we model inventory growth by the following 
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Using (5) and (6), we estimate the normal level of production costs as: 
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 We model the normal level of discretionary expenses as: 
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Modeling discretionary expenses as a function of current sales creates a mechanical 
problem if firms manage sales upwards to increase reported earnings in a certain year, 
resulting in significantly lower residuals from running a regression as derived in (8). To 
address this issue, we model discretionary expenses as a function of lagged sales and 
estimate the following model to derive ‘normal’ levels of discretionary expenses: 
 , 11 2
, 1 , 1 , 1
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 In the above equations CFO is cash flow from operations in period t (Compustat data 
item 308 – annual Compustat data item 124); Prod represents the production costs in 
period t, defined as the sum of COGS (annual Compustat data item 41) and the change in 
inventories (annual Compustat data item 3); DiscExp represents the discretionary 
expenditures in period t, defined as the sum of advertising expenses (annual Compustat 
data item 45), R&D expenses (annual Compustat data item 46)16 and SG&A (annual 
Compustat data item 189).  The abnormal CFO (R_CFO), abnormal production costs 
(R_PROD) and abnormal discretionary expenses (R_DISX) are computed as the 
difference between the actual values and the normal levels predicted from equations (4) 
(7) and (9). We use these three variables as proxies for real earnings management. In 
addition, we compute a single variable by combining these three individual variables.  
Specifically, we compute RM_PROXY as the sum of the standardized variables, R_CFO, 
R_PROD and R_DISX, and report results corresponding to this single real earnings 
management proxy as well. 
                                                 
16 As long as SG&A is available, advertising expenses and R&D are set to zero if they are missing. 
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4. Tests and Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Earnings Management  
 
We begin with an exploratory analysis of the trends over time in the various earnings 
management metrics. Table 1A provides summary statistics of the full sample while 
Table 1B provides summary statistics of the ExecuComp sample.17  Both samples are 
significantly larger (at the 0.001 level) in terms of total assets and market capitalization 
when compared to the “average” firm listed on COMPUSTAT.  Sample firms have a 
13% annual growth in sales, a market-to-book ratio of 4.94 and a leverage ratio of 0.41 
(18%, 4.70, and 0.22 respectively for the ExecuComp subsample).  
The operating cycles of our sample firms is, on average, approximately 142.56 days 
(124.69 days for the ExecuComp subsample) suggesting that accruals are likely to 
reverse in the subsequent year.  Consistent with prior research we find a positive and 
significant correlation (0.019, Pearson; 0.053 Spearman; both significant at the 1% level, 
results not tabulated) between the operating cycle and discretionary accruals (Dechow 
and Dichev, 2002).  Finally, requiring the availability of ExecuComp data while 
considerably increasing firm size does not seem to have a significant impact on 
fundamental measures such as leverage, growth of sales, or market-to-book ratios.  
As expected, TA (total accruals deflated by prior-year total assets) are negative at 
-0.10 (-0.07 for the ExecuComp subsample) with a standard deviation of 0.25 (0.12 for 
the for the ExecuComp subsample).  In contrast the average DA (discretionary accruals) 
                                                 
17 Whenever possible, we perform the tests on both the full and the ExecuComp samples to assess the 
impact of the ExecuComp selection on our results. 
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are 0.00 (standard deviation of 0.20) for the full sample and -0.01 (0.11) for the 
ExecuComp subsample.18   
While the average DA is zero, we find that positive discretionary accruals 
(Positive_DA) are, on average, larger in magnitude than negative discretionary accruals 
(Negative_DA).  This is not only true for the mean, but also for the median and the 75th 
percentiles. This is however not true for the ExecuComp sample (except at the 75th 
percentile). Thus, for the full sample, it appears that larger earnings increasing DA’s are 
followed by smaller but more frequent reversals.   
The main variable of interest is the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(ABS_DA).  We use the absolute value because our hypotheses do not predict any specific 
direction for earnings management.  Moreover, the absolute value also captures accrual 
reversals following earnings management.  The average for ABS_DA is 0.11 (0.07 for the 
ExecuComp sample).  At first, this may seem a large value as percentage of total assets.  
However, recall that while DA has a mean of zero, the mean is shifted to the right by 
taking absolute values.19, 20   
 Nevertheless, we conduct some additional analyses to get more reassurance on the 
magnitudes of the discretionary accrual measure. First, we selected a few firms that had 
                                                 
18 Note that the mean Jones model residual is zero by construction (residual of a regression), whereas the 
mean modified Jones model residual is not constrained to be zero by construction.   
19 If X follows a normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ2 then the expected absolute value of X is 
given by 
⎥⎦
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where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function 
20 We also perform two “sanity checks.”  First, we generated 1000 random variables from a normal 
distribution with mean 0.00 and a standard deviation of 0.20.  The mean of the absolute values of those 
random variables is 0.173.  Second, we computed the ROA and the absolute value of the ROA for our 
sample firms.  While the average ROA for our sample firms is -0.06 with a standard deviation of 0.191 
(0.046 and 0.207 for the ExecuComp subsample) the absolute value of ROA is 0.22 (0.118 for the 
ExecuComp subsample).    
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very high absolute values of DA as percentage of total assets (higher than 15%) and 
examined their financial statements.21 Among the 12 firms examined, we find that more 
than 50 percent of them had large asset impairment and restructuring charges and write-
offs related to goodwill, while the rest had merger related charges and significant growth 
in accounts receivables and inventory.  These partly explain the large magnitudes we 
obtain. To check whether the results are affected when we eliminate outliers, we 
winsorized the top and bottom one percent of the distribution. On winsorizing, the mean 
(median) of ABS_DA, is 0.06 (0.05) for the full sample and 0.04 (0.04) for the 
ExecuComp sample.  These magnitudes of discretionary accruals appear more realistic.  
Moreover, our cross-sectional results and inferences are not affected by repeating all our 
analyses using the winsorized sample.  
 Finally, we also check the discretionary accruals of the firms that were involved in 
accounting scandals.  Untabulated results indicate that all but one of the firms involved in 
accounting scandals fall in the 90th percentile of the ABS_DA distribution in the SCA 
period.  
The last three rows of Panels A and B of Table 1 report our proxies for real earnings 
management.  Comparing the 25th and 75th percentiles of the real earnings management 
proxies to DA suggests that accrual-based earnings management takes larger values.  This 
observation is consistent with Graham et al.’s (2005) survey result suggesting that real 
earnings management is more costly.   
The last five rows of Panel B of Table 1 report both the dollar amount obtained from 
bonuses and characteristics of equity-based compensation, i.e., exercisable and 
unexercisable options and stock ownership. For the entire sample period, the average 
                                                 
21 We thank one of the referees for this suggestion.  
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ExecuComp CEO received annual bonuses of $454,040, representing 16 percent of their 
compensation. Option grants and other unexercisable options are on average 0.34% of 
outstanding shares, while exercisable options are on average 0.75% of outstanding shares. 
The sum of restricted stock grants and aggregate shares held by the CEO averages 5.19%.   
Table 2, Panel A summarizes time-trends of the accrual and real earnings 
management proxies.  To summarize the data, we regress each of the variables on a time-
trend variable, Time, defined as the difference between the year and 1987, and two 
dummy variables, SCA, which takes the value of 1 in the scandal period (years 2000 and 
2001) and 0 otherwise, and SOX which takes the value of 1 in the post-SOX period (years 
2002, 2003 and 2005) and 0 otherwise.  We choose this procedure to describe the 
variables because many of our variables exhibit significant time trends (non-stationarity), 
rendering traditional summary statistics uninformative. 
The coefficient for the time trend in Row 1 ( bˆ ) indicates that the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) has been increasing significantly (at the 1% level) over 
the sample period with that increase being nearly symmetric for both Positive_DA and 
Negative_DA (rows 2 and 3).    
The magnitude of discretionary accruals increased significantly in the SCA period ( cˆ  
in Row 1) with positive (i.e., income-increasing, Row 2) discretionary accruals 
contributing twice as much to that increase than income-decreasing DAs (Row 3, both 
significant at the 1% level).  
Finally, the magnitude of discretionary accruals declined significantly in the post-
SOX period ( dˆ  in Row 1).  Moreover, the magnitude (absolute value) of the coefficient 
for Positive_DA ( dˆ  in Row 2) is approximately three times larger than the coefficient for 
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Negative_DA ( dˆ  in Row 3) suggesting that most of that decline in accrual-based 
management results from the reduction of Positive_DAs.   
Figures 2, 3a and 3b provide graphical illustrations of these results. Figure 2 indicates 
that the SCA period was, indeed, associated with a high level of earnings management.  
Figures 3a and 3b plot the trends in positive and negative discretionary accruals.   
Positive discretionary accruals peaked in the SCA period and negative discretionary 
accruals were the lowest in that period. These trends reversed in the post-SOX period. 
Among the real earnings management variable, except for R_DISX which increased 
over the period, the other real earnings management variables do not show an increasing 
trend over the sample period (the time trend coefficients are either not significant or 
negative).  Abnormal production costs and abnormal cash flows both increased 
significantly in the post-SOX period, but were either not significantly higher or were 
significantly lower in the SCA period. On the other hand, abnormal discretionary 
expenses were significantly higher in the SCA period and significantly lower in the post-
SOX period. The combined variable RM_PROXY shows a decreasing trend over time, but 
is significantly higher both in the SCA period and in the post-SOX periods.  
Figure 4 graphically illustrates these trends.  A comparison of the post-SOX 
coefficients for accrual-based and the real earnings management suggests that there may 
have been a substitution effect: while accrual-based earnings management decreased, 
overall firms increased the use of real earnings management methods.   
The correlation among accrual-based and real earnings management is reported in 
Table 2, Panel B.  The correlations are consistent with such a substitution effect: we find 
a significant negative relation between discretionary accruals and the real earnings 
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management metrics, suggesting that firms are likely to substitute between these two 
earnings management methods. Further, the three real earnings management variables are 
also negatively correlated, indicating that firms switch between real earnings 
management methods.   
In summary, the above analysis indicates that the overall level of accrual-based 
earnings management decreased from the SCA period to the post-SOX period, while 
overall the level of real earnings management increased in the post-SOX period.  
However, there was significantly higher earnings management, particularly income-
increasing earnings management, during the SCA period as compared to the pre-SCA 
period.  One interpretation of this result is that the SCA period was characterized by 
higher earnings management; and the scandal firms were not just a “few bad apples,” but 
a representation of the generally high level of corporate misconduct.  Another 
observation is that, although earnings management using accrual-based means increased 
from the pre-SCA to the SCA period, it declined significantly from the SCA period to the 
post-SOX period. 
Whether this decline is caused by the passage of SOX or other concurrent events 
(such as the negative publicity of the most egregious governance failures and the highly 
visible enforcement actions directed at the offending corporate officers) cannot be 
inferred from this analysis, however.  Moreover, firms appeared to have switched to 
managing earnings using real management techniques after SOX, probably because such 
methods of manipulation are harder to detect. How this substitution between the different 
types of earnings management affected the overall level of earnings management post-
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SOX is unclear. We formally examine the determinants of earnings management in our 
multivariate analysis next. 
 
4.2 Trends in and Determinants of Earnings Management  
We examine the trends in and determinants of the level of earnings management over 
time by estimating the following regression: 
 
SOXOWNERSCAOWNER
OWNERSOXOPTIONEX
SCAOPTIONEXOPTIONEX
SOXOPTIONUNSCAOPTIONUN
OPTIONUNSOXBONUSSCABONUS
BONUSPROXYRMSOXSCA
TimeMKTVALGDPBIGDEP
jj
jj
jj
jj
jjj
j
jjjj
××+××+
×+××+
××+×+
××+××+
×+××+××+
×+×+×+×+
×+×+Δ×+×+=
1918
1716
1514
1312
11109
8765
43210
_
__
__
_
_
 
αα
αα
αα
αα
ααα
αααα
ααααα
 (10)              
 
where DEPj represents the various earnings management metrics, including discretionary 
accruals, positive discretionary accruals, and negative discretionary accruals; BIG is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a big-five audit firm (or their successors); 
ΔGDP is the change in the GDP; MKTVAL is market value of equity; Time is the calendar 
year minus 1987; SCA is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the years 2000 and 2001, 
and 0 otherwise (represents the SCA period); SOX is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
for the years 2002 onwards, and 0 otherwise (represents the post-SOX period); BONUS is 
the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the 
CEO and the CFO of a firm; EX_OPTION is the number of unexercised options that the 
executives held at year-end that were vested scaled by total outstanding shares of the 
firm. UN_OPTION is the number of options grants in the current period and other 
unexercised options that the executives held at year-end that have not vested scaled by 
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total outstanding shares of the firm; and OWNER is the sum of restricted stock grants in 
the current period and the aggregate number of shares held by the executives at year-end 
(excluding stock options) scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.22 The 
compensation variables proxy for performance-based compensation and are defined in 
accordance with prior studies (Chang and Warfield, 2005). We include these variables to 
test the conjecture that the bonus and equity components of executive compensation are 
likely to induce opportunistic behavior in managers. 23 
We include the variable ΔGDP as a proxy for real economic activity.  We include this 
to control for the effect of economic activity on earnings management, since what might 
be classified as opportunistic earnings management may, in fact, be a consequence of 
changing economic conditions.  Discretionary accruals may also reflect firms’ responses 
to and representations of changes in economic conditions.  If this were true, then changes 
in earnings management metrics will coincide with changes in measures of economic 
activity such as operating cash flows, revenues, prior stock returns, industry performance, 
changes in gross domestic product, etc. Further, after controlling for changes in economic 
activities, there should be no relation between increases in earnings management and the 
compensation variables. 24  
 We include control variables for the auditors in the above regression to examine 
whether the earnings management activity of firms audited by the large audit firms were 
different from the rest of the sample firms over the three sub-periods analyzed.  Note that 
                                                 
22 We also repeat the analyses by measuring the compensation related variables for the top five executives 
of a firm, and the results are qualitatively unchanged.  
23 The timing of variable measurement is consistent with Cheng and Warfield (2005, p. 448). The equity 
incentive variables are measured during or at the end of fiscal year t whereas the earnings management 
variable is measured based on information disclosed after the end of fiscal year t. 
24 In Section 4.4 we discuss some robustness tests we conduct to further test whether we are indeed 
capturing earnings management activities.  
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we make no claim that differences in the earnings management activities (if any) of these 
firms were to the result of the monitoring activities of the audit firms, since there could 
be a self-selection by certain types of firms in their selection of  big audit firms.  In 
addition, to the extent that audit firms specialize in specific industries and levels of 
earnings management are likely to vary across industries, the audit firm dummies may 
also control for industry characteristics.  Finally, we include market value of equity as a 
proxy for firm size.  
 Next, we examine the trends in and determinants of real earnings management 
activities of firms by estimating the following regression: 
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where DEPj represents the three real earnings management metrics R_CFO, R_PROD 
and R_DISX and the combined variable RM_PROXY. All other variables are as defined 
above.  
 Firms may follow an overall earnings management strategy and use a mix of real and 
accrual-based earnings management tools. Alternatively, they can choose between the 
two management techniques, using the technique that is less costly for them.  To control 
for this possibility we also include a variable representing accrual-based earnings 
management (we include ABS_DA in the regression).  If it were more costly for firms to 
manage earnings using accrual-based techniques after the passage of SOX and they 
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substituted this by using real management techniques instead, then we should observe a 
significant increase in the latter after SOX. On the other hand, firms could have decreased 
earnings management activities as a whole – in which case we would observe a decrease 
in real earnings management after SOX as well. The results of these regressions are 
discussed next.  
 
4.3 Results  
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the determinants of the level of earnings 
management by firms. Table 3 reports the results when we use the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, ABS_DA, and when we split discretionary accruals into positive 
and negative discretionary accruals.  Table 4 reports the results when we use the 
measures for real earnings management activities. We discuss the results for the accrual-
based earnings management variables first. 
Consistent with the preliminary analysis reported in Table 2, we find a positive trend 
in the level of earnings management, including income-increasing earnings management, 
and a negative trend in income-decreasing earnings management. This indicates that 
overall earnings management increased over the sample period.  The dummy variable 
SOX is negative and significant for ABS_DA as well as for positive discretionary accruals 
and positive and significant for negative discretionary accruals. This suggests that, 
controlling for the other independent variables, the period after SOX was characterized 
by lower income-increasing earnings management. Several simultaneous occurrences 
could have contributed to a decrease in earnings management activities after passage of 
SOX, including the increased vigilance of investors, auditors and regulators, and greater 
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care taken by managers in financial reporting after the adverse publicity caused by the 
scandals.  Thus, we are cautious in attributing the decrease in the level of earnings 
management solely to the passage of SOX from this analysis.  
Unlike our analysis in Table 2, the dummy variable representing the scandal period is 
not significant for any of the variables.  Thus, the entire increase in the accrual-based 
earnings management is related to the increase in equity-based compensation.  
We find that the percentage of bonus compensation is not correlated with earnings 
management for the entire period, and this association did not significantly change in the 
SCA or the post-SOX periods.  Positive discretionary accruals, however, were significant 
and positively associated with the percentage of compensation received from bonuses in 
the scandal period. 
Consistent with our conjecture, the percentage of compensation derived from option 
grants and other unexercised options and stock ownership are significantly positively 
associated with discretionary accruals as well as with positive discretionary accruals. For 
option grants and other unexercised options this effect increased significantly in the SCA 
period for positive discretionary accruals and decreased significantly in the post-SOX 
period.  This suggests that option compensation provide managers with incentives to 
manipulate earnings upwards (Fuller and Jensen, 2002, Greenspan 2002, and Coffee 
2003), and this effect was significantly higher during the period surrounding the 
corporate scandals. One possible explanation for the decline after SOX could be the 
penalties on incentive compensation introduced by SOX. Option grants and other 
unexercised options and ownership are significantly negatively correlated with negative 
discretionary accruals overall and after SOX. This suggests that the presence of stock and 
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options in the compensation structure reduces the incentive to manage earnings 
downwards. Surprisingly, option grants and other unexercised options are positively 
associated with options in the scandal period. We find this positive coefficient in the 
scandal period surprising and difficult to explain.  
The coefficient on exercisable options is positive (for ABS_DA and Positive_DA) and 
negative (for Negative_DA) but statistically insignificant, a result consistent with the 
evidence in Cheng and Warfield (2005). This finding is somewhat unintuitive because 
one would expect both unexercisable and exercisable options to have similar effects on 
managers’ incentives to manage earnings. Cheng and Warfield argue that equity 
incentives lead to earnings management via future trading in the company’s stock, and 
because exercisable options are not correlated with future trading (unlike unexercisable 
options and ownership), these are not related to earnings management. This is likely to 
explain our results as well, but we do not examine this reasoning further as this is beyond 
the scope of our analysis.  
These results are reinforced by Figure 5 which plots bonus and option compensation 
(based on a Black Scholes valuation) as a percentage of total compensation.  The figure 
indicates that while bonus compensation was relatively stable around 15-20 percent over 
the entire period, stock option compensation increased over time and peaked to as much 
as 45 percent of total compensation in 2001. This increase in option compensation during 
the scandal period provides an explanation for the significantly higher association 
between options and earnings management during that period.  This is consistent with the 
evidence in Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006).  Overall, 
the evidence in Cheng and Warfield (2005) suggests that equity incentives derived from 
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stock option compensation lead to incentives to engage in accrual-based earnings 
management activities.  In addition, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) show that the use 
of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms 
where the CEO’s compensation is more closely tied to stock options. The evidence we 
document also supports the assertions made by Coffee (2003) and Greenspan (2002), and 
Fuller and Jensen (2002), among others, that stock-based compensation increase 
managers’ incentives to inflate reported earnings and, consequently, stock prices.  
Overall, these results identify compensation, primarily derived from stock options, as 
being significantly correlated with accrual-based earnings management in the period 
leading up to the passage of SOX. The association between options and accrual-based 
earnings management increased during the scandal period and decreased in the post-SOX 
period. As mentioned earlier, one explanation for the latter result could be the provisions 
in Sections 302 and 304 in SOX that mandates the return of any incentive compensation 
owing to material noncompliance with any financial reporting requirement. This could 
have made executives with stock options more conservative in their financial reporting 
practices. 
The coefficient for the change in GDP (∆GDP), our proxy for real economic activity, 
is negative and significant for discretionary accruals and for positive discretionary 
accruals and positive and significant for negative discretionary accruals.25 This result has 
two (not necessarily mutually exclusive) interpretations.  First, it suggests that even 
absent opportunistic behavior by managers, poor economic conditions are accompanied 
                                                 
25 The documented results are robust to an alternative measures of economic activities, namely, industry 
adjusted ROA. We also repeated the analysis by including measures of growth, either the book-to-market 
ratio or the growth in sales as an additional control variable, and our results are qualitatively unaltered by 
these inclusions. Including prior year stock returns as well as using the logarithm of market value of equity 
as alternative measures of size does not affect the reported results. 
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by more discretionary accruals.  Second, corporations are more likely to manage earnings 
when economic conditions are poor.  However, even after controlling for economic 
conditions, we find a significant reduction in earnings management activities following 
the passage of SOX. We find evidence that earnings management is significantly less for 
larger firms and for clients of big audit firms.26 
We next discuss the results for the real earnings management variables (Table 4). The 
results are similar for all three real earnings management variables and the combined 
variable RM_PROXY; thus, we report all three sets of results but discuss those for only 
the combined variable RM_PROXY (we point out differences in the results whenever 
applicable). Consistent with the results in Table 2, the level of overall real earnings 
management decreased over the sample period, but increased significantly during the 
scandal period and after SOX. However, discretionary spending increased over the 
sample period and in the scandal period, and decreased significantly after SOX.  
 The accrual-based earnings management variable, ABS_DA, is negative and 
significant, which indicate that firms substitute between real and accrual-based earnings 
management activities, a result consistent with Graham et al. (2005) and Zang (2006).  
The coefficient estimates on bonus, option grants and other unexercisable options and 
stock ownership are negative and significant, indicating that executives with higher 
bonus, unexercisable options and stock ownership managed earnings using real 
techniques less. However, except for discretionary spending, the interaction terms 
between option grants and other unexercisable options and SOX and between ownership 
                                                 
26 In unreported results, we did not find significant differences in earnings management between Big and 
non-Big audit firm clients between the pre-SCA, the SCA, and the post-SOX periods. 
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and SOX are positive and significant, suggesting that executives with more unexercisable 
options and stock managed earnings using real methods more in the post-SOX period.  
In light of the results obtained for the accrual-based earnings management variables 
which indicate that executives with more stock and options manage earnings more, the 
above findings could result from the substitution between real and accrual-based earnings 
management activities undertaken by firms. In the post-SOX period, we found earlier that 
those individuals with more stock and unexercisable options were less likely to use 
accrual-based means to manage earnings. These results support the conjecture that after 
SOX, stock and options provided increased incentives to manage earnings using real 
methods. In other words, if managers expect earnings management using real methods to 
be harder to detect, the passage of SOX is likely to result in a substitution of real earnings 
management for accrual-based earnings management. Similar to results for accrual-based 
earnings management, exercisable options are not significantly associated with real 
earnings management. The results for the other control variables are similar to those 
obtained in the case of the accrual-based earnings management variables.  
Finally, we refined our real earnings management analysis by distinguishing between 
manufacturing firms and non-manufacturing firms:  Overproduction and price discounts 
both generate abnormally high production costs relative to sales. Both manufacturing 
firms and non-manufacturing firms can offer price discounts to increase sales but 
overproduction as a real earnings management tool is available only to manufacturing 
firms. Based on two-digit SIC codes, we divided the sample firms into manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries and repeated the analysis. We continue to find for non-
manufacturing firms results which are consistent with those documented in column 2 of 
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Table 4. We tested an alternative specification in which we included a dummy variable 
for manufacturing firms in Table 4 and interacted it with the time trend variables. We 
defined this dummy to take the value of 1 if the industry’s two-digit SIC code falls 
between 20 and 39. The dummy variable came in positive and significant (an intercept 
effect), and the interaction with SCA, although negative, was insignificant, whereas the 
interaction with SOX was significantly positive, consistent with the results documented in 
Table 4, column 2.  Finally, including interaction terms between the variables ∆GDP and 
BIG with the time variables did not affect the results reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
Overall, the multivariate analysis can be summarized as follows: once we control for 
changes in the compensation structure, we do not find support for the claim that the SCA 
period was, on average, characterized by significantly higher accrual-based earnings 
management activities.  However, we find higher real earnings management in the SCA 
period.  These results suggest that there was an (as yet unidentified) exogenous force that 
affected the compensation structure and also either directly or indirectly (via the 
compensation structure) affected accrual-based earnings management.   
After SOX, the level of accrual-based earnings management declined, but there was a 
significant increase in the overall level of real earnings management activities. Though 
the analysis does not allow inferences on whether the overall level of earnings 
management changed after SOX, it does indicate that firms seemed to switch to more real 
management activities after SOX, possibly since such methods are harder to detect thus 
reducing the costs of earnings management. Finally, we find that compensation derived 
primarily from unexercisable stock options contributes significantly to the incentives of 
 31
executives to manipulate earnings, a result consistent with recent research (e.g., Cheng 
and Warfield, 2005). 
 
4.4 Suspect Firm Analysis  
 One concern in the above analysis is whether our proxies are capturing earnings 
management activities of firms, or whether these trends that we observe represent some 
other phenomenon. To obtain more confidence that the above results do represent the 
trend in earnings management activities, we also conduct the following analysis. We 
identify a sample of firms that are likely to have managed earnings based on three 
benchmarks that firms are likely to have incentives to meet, and examine whether 
earnings management strategies (i.e., the values of discretionary accruals, DA, and 
RM_PROXY) to meet these benchmarks have changed in the post-SOX period as 
compared to the pre-SOX period.   
 First, as in Roychowdhury (2006), we identify firm-year observations with net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets that lies in the interval [0, 0.005) 
(we label these as SUSPECT firm-years), since it is likely that these firms during these 
years managed their earnings to report income marginally above zero. Table 5, Panel A 
reports the earnings management before and after SOX for firms that “just” managed to 
avoid reporting a loss. 
 Next, we use a second measure of SUSPECT firm-years when the change in net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets lies in the interval [0, 0.005). 
This latter definition is consistent with evidence in prior research that firms are more 
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likely to manage earnings in order to meet prior years’ earnings numbers (Graham et. al., 
2005).  The results for this measure are reported in Table 5, Panel B. 
 Finally, recent research has suggested that meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts is an 
important benchmark for firms and firms are likely to manipulate earnings to achieve this 
(DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999; Graham et al., 2005). Consistent with 
Roychowdhury (2006), we examine the accrual and real earnings management activities 
of firms that managed to meet or beat the final analysts’ consensus forecast outstanding 
prior to the earnings announcement date (we use this consensus forecast as the ex post 
proxy for what managers expect the final consensus forecast to be for the year).27 We 
obtain annual analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S and consider only the forecasts made and/or 
revised after the beginning of the fiscal year. We define the forecast error (FE) as the 
difference between actual earnings per share (EPS) as reported by I/B/E/S less the 
consensus forecast of earnings per share. We focus on firm-year observations where the 
FE is one cent per share or less ($0.00 ≤ EPS – Consensus forecast ≤ $0.01). We then 
define SUSPECT_FE as a binary variable taking the value of 1 if FE is one cent per share 
or less and zero otherwise. Table 5, Panel C presents the results of this analysis.  
For each of the above three subgroups, we also compute earnings management for 
firms that just missed the three earnings targets and for all other firms that neither just 
missed nor just made the income targets. Because the suspect firms are likely to have 
engaged in income-increasing earnings management, we find that (not surprisingly) both 
before and after SOX, all three groups of suspect firms had significantly higher 
                                                 
27 Note that as an earnings benchmark meeting/beating analyst forecasts are different from meeting/ beating 
the zero earnings benchmark and loss avoidance. Given that analysts revise their forecasts several times a 
year, this forms a moving target and it is not obvious as to which specific forecasts managers regard as the 
target they need to beat.  
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discretionary accruals when compared to either comparison group (results not tabulated).  
However, all firms that just avoided a loss (Panel A), that just managed to meet-or-beat 
last year’s earnings (Panel B), as well as those that managed to meet or beat the 
consensus analyst forecast (Panel C) used significantly less income-increasing accrual-
management after SOX when compared to firms in the same bin-intervals before SOX.  
An analysis of the real earnings management behavior of these firms indicates that the 
SUSPECT firms used significantly lower real earnings management than the other firms 
both before and after SOX (untabulated).  However, real earnings management for these 
firms is significantly higher after SOX when compared to the firms in the same bin-
intervals prior to SOX.  This analysis provides us with greater confidence in the earlier 
results and strengthens our argument for the substitution between accrual and real 
earnings management methods after SOX.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
We document both real and accrual-based changes in earnings management over time 
and examine whether the passage of SOX affected earnings management activities.  Our 
results indicate that earnings management increased steadily over the sample period, and 
meeting or beating prior year’s earnings numbers, consensus analysts’ forecasts and 
avoiding losses continued to be important incentives to manage earnings.  We find an 
increase in earnings management in the period preceding the passage of SOX.   
Our evidence suggests that subsequent to the passage of SOX, the level of earnings 
management returned to the pre-SOX trend line.  We also find that while the level of 
accrual-based earnings management declined, the level of real earnings management 
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activities increased significantly after the passage of SOX, suggesting that firms shifted 
from using accrual-based to real earnings management after SOX.  Finally, our results 
indicate that the increase in accrual-based earnings management prior to SOX was 
concurrent with a shift in the fraction of equity-based executive compensation.   
 Our analysis does not permit us to attribute the above changes in earnings 
management activities solely to SOX. Several simultaneous occurrences could have 
contributed to a decrease in earnings management activities after passage of SOX, 
including the increased vigilance of investors, auditors and regulators, and greater care 
taken by managers in financial reporting after the adverse publicity caused by the 
scandals. Thus, although most of these other concurrent events are indirectly related to 
the regulations in SOX, we are cautious in making any causality inferences.  
Finally, consistent with the results in Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006), we interpret our evidence that the opportunistic behaviors of 
managers was one of the major antecedents of accrual-based earnings management 
during the period leading to SOX – primarily related to dramatic increases in the fraction 
of compensation derived from stock options.   
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FIGURE 1: TIME PERIODS ANALYSED 
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Figure 2: Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals Over Time, 1987-2005
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Legend to Figure 2: This figure plots the absolute value of discretionary accruals computed 
using the Modified Jones Model over the 1987-2005 sample period. 
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Figure 3a: Postive Discretionary Accruals Over Time, 1987-2005
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Figure 3b: Negative Discretionary Accruals Over Time, 1987-2005 
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Legend to Figure 3: This figure plots positive and negative discretionary accruals computed 
using the Modified Jones Model over the 1987-2005 sample period. 
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Figure 4: Real Earnings Management Proxies Over Time, 1987-2005
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Legend to Figure 4: Figure 4 plots abnormal cash from operations, abnormal production costs, 
abnormal discretionary expenses, and the sum of the standardized three real earnings 
management proxies, RM_PROXY over the 1987-2005 sample period.  
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Figure 5: Compensation Over Time, 1992 - 2005
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Legend to Figure 5:  This figures plots trends in executive compensation (for CEOs and CFOs) 
over the sample period, 1992-2005. All variables are presented as a percentage of total 
compensation. 
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Table 1, Panel A 
Full Sample, 1987-2005; N = 87,217 
 25
th 
Percentile Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets  17.54 1401.43 89.02 438.68 8815 
Market Capitalization 15.08 1616.11 76.71 441.13 11855.55 
Sales 17.05 1396.32 94.70 492.98 7555.65 
Growth of Sales -0.04 0.13 0.08 0.25 0.49 
OC (Days) 79.15 142.56 124.05 186.01 90.89 
Leverage 0.04           0.41        0.21 0.39 0.26 
Market-to-Book 1.11 4.94 1.92 3.48 6.17 
Total Accruals  -0.12 -0.10 -0.06 -0.001 0.25 
DA -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.20 
Positive_DA 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.09 
Negative_DA -0.03 -0.05 -0.02      -0.01 0.18 
ABS_DA 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.17 
R_CFO -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.35 
R_PROD -0.17 -0.06 0.04 0.06 0.31 
R_DISX -0.09 0.08 0.01 0.18 0.58 
RM_PROXY -0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.35 
Table 1, Panel B 
ExecuComp Sample, 1992-2005; N = 31,668 
 25
th 
Percentile Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets  334.88 4232.66 849.40 2611.80 19038.10 
Market Capitalization 388.27 5491.55 978.67 3280.46 20283.20 
Sales 331.89 4025.76 895.94 2678.90 13039.01 
Growth of Sales 0.01 0.18 0.09 0.22 0.76 
OC (Days) 72.49 124.69 111.27 160.10 73.61 
Leverage 0.05 0.22 0.20 0.33 0.20 
Market-to-Book 1.63 4.70 2.48 4.04 6.45 
Total Accruals  -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.12 
DA -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.11 
Positive_DA 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.06 
Negative_DA -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 0.08 
ABS_DA 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.09 
R_CFO -0.00 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.15 
R_PROD -0.17 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.28 
R_DISX -0.10 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.15 
RM_PROXY -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.16 
BONUS (%) 0.04 0.16 0.14 0.25 0.15 
BONUS ($) 60.00 454.04 219.32 526.80 821.30 
EX_OPTIONS (%) 0.312 0.745 0.432 0.874 0.857 
UN_OPTIONS (%) 0.104 0.341 0.214 0.473 0.537 
OWNER (%) 0.764 5.191 1.067 3.057 1.067 
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Notes to Table 1: 
 
Total Assets is annual Compustat data item 6; Market Capitalization is measured as the price per share 
(annual Compustat data item 199) times the number of shares outstanding (annual Compustat data item 25).  
Sales is annual Compustat data item 12; Growth of Sales is the change is sales divided by lagged sales; 
Total Accruals is the difference between operating cash flows (annual Compustat data item 308), adjusted 
for extraordinary items and discontinued operations (annual Compustat data item 124) and income before 
extraordinary items (annual Compustat data item 123 ) divided by lagged total assets; DA are discretionary 
accruals computed using the Modified Jones Model; ABS_DA is the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals computed using the Modified Jones model; OC, or the operating Cycle (in days), is calculated 
as
)360/(
2/)(
)360/(
2/)( 11
COGS
INVINV
Sales
ARAR tttt −− +++ ; Leverage is total liabilities (annual Compustat data item 9 plus data item 34 ) 
divided by total assets; Book-to-Market ratio is calculated as the market capitalization divided by the book 
value of common equity (annual Compustat data item 60 ); Positive_DA is the value of positive 
discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones Model;  Negative_DA is the value of negative 
discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones Model; R_CFO represents the level of abnormal 
cash flows from operations; R_PROD represents the level of abnormal production costs, where production 
costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventories; R_DISX represents the 
level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are the sum of advertising expenses 
(annual Compustat data item 45), R&D expenses (annual Compustat data item 46) and SG&A expenses 
(annual Compustat data 189); RM_PROXY is the sum of the standardized three real earnings management 
proxies, i.e., R_CFO, R_PROD and R_DISX; BONUS (%) is the average bonus compensation as a 
proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm; BONUS ($) is the BONUS 
variable in Execucomp in thousands of dollars; EX_OPTIONS (%) represents exercisable options which is 
the number of unexercised options that the executive held at year-end that were vested scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm; UN_OPTIONS (%) represents unexercisable options defined as the number 
of unexercised options (including options grants in the current period) that the executive held at year-end 
that had not vested scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm; and OWNER is defined as the sum of 
restricted stock grants in the current period and the aggregate number of shares held by the executive at 
year-end (excluding stock options) scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
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Table 2, Panel A 
Time Trend Analysis of Earnings Management Metrics Over 
Time, 1987 – 2005 
 
SOXdSCAcTimebaDep jq ×+×+×+=  Dependent Variables 
aˆ  bˆ  cˆ  dˆ  Adjusted R2 
ABS_DA 0.053*** 0.003*** 0.027*** -0.015*** 0.024 
Positive_DA 0.028*** 0.002*** 0.026*** -0.019** 0.029 
Negative_DA -0.040*** -0.003*** -0.012*** 0.006*** 0.015 
R_PROD -0.040*** -0.002 0.008 0.032*** 0.009 
R_CFO 0.022*** -0.003** -0.007*** 0.007** 0.007 
R_DISX 0.028*** 0.005*** 0.008*** -0.011*** 0.010 
RM_PROXY -0.018*** -0.005** 0.033** 0.041*** 0.011 
 
 
Table 2, Panel B 
Correlation between the Earnings Management Proxies 
1987-2005 
 DA ABS_DA R_CFO R_PROD R_DISX RM_PROXY 
DA 1 0.398*** -0.237*** -0.029*** -0.163*** -0.331*** 
ABS_DA 0.298*** 1 -0.184*** -0.047*** -0.174*** -0.153*** 
R_CFO -0.214*** -0.114*** 1 -0.274*** -0.142*** 0.447*** 
R_PROD -0.024*** -0.314*** -0.183*** 1 -0.243*** 0.579*** 
R_DISX -0.143*** -0.164*** -0.214*** -0.187*** 1 0.487*** 
RM_PROXY -0.237*** -0.149*** 0.381*** 0.427** 0.422*** 1 
 
 
     *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% 
 
Notes to Table 2: 
 
DA are discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones model; ABS_DA  is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones model; Positive_DA is the value of positive 
discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones Model; Negative_DA is the value of negative 
discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones Model;; TIME is a trend variable equal to the 
difference between the current year and 1987; SCA is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is either 
2000 or 2001; SOX is a dummy variable for years equal to 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of Accrual Based Earnings Management Activities 
 1987 –  2005 
 
SOXOWNERSCAOWNEROWNER
SOXOPTIONEXSCAOPTIONEXOPTIONEX
SOXOPTIONUNSCAOPTIONUNOPTIONUN
SOXBONUSSCABONUSBONUSPROXYRM
SOXSCATimeMKTVALGDPBIGDEP
jjj
jjj
jjj
jjj
jjjj
××+××+×+
××+××+×+
××+××+×+
××+××+×+×+
×+×+×+×+Δ×+×+=
191817
161514
131211
10987
6543210
___
___
_
 
ααα
ααα
ααα
αααα
ααααααα
 
ABS_DA Positive_DA Negative_DA 
 
Coeff.  (t-stat) Coeff.   (t-stat) Coeff.  (t-stat) 
Intercept     0.124    (23.22)  0.024    (9.73)  -0.053    (-18.41) 
BIG       -0.025    (-6.91)  -0.008    (-2.29)  -0.013    (-2.51) 
ΔGDP  -0.118  (-6.77)  -0.138    (-5.87)  0.094    (2.96) 
MKTVAL    -0.008   (-20.09)  -0.002    (-7.24)   0.006    (13.42) 
Time   0.003    (8.27)    0.003     (15.43)  -0.013    (-2.69) 
SCA        0.002   (0.38)  -0.001    (-0.37)  -0.002    (-0.47) 
SOX   -0.018  (-4.27)  -0.021    (-6.43)  0.008    (3.41) 
RM_PROXY  -0.424  (-5.74)  -0.517  (-6.14)  0.113    (1.62)  
BONUS     0.002    (0.42)  -0.004    (-1.21)  0.003    (0.83) 
BONUS × SCA   -0.005  (-0.57)  0.026    (2.49)  0.017    (0.91) 
BONUS × SOX    0.013   (1.18)  0.007    (1.12)  0.002    (0.46) 
UN_OPTION       0.537    (12.61)  0.498    (8.73)  -0.261    (-8.29) 
UN_OPTION × SCA     -0.157     (-0.92)  0.176    (6.67)  0.148    (2.24) 
UN_OPTION × SOX     -0.243    (-3.57)  -0.186   (-7.44)  -0.084    (-2.04) 
EX_OPTION    0.123     (1.09)  0.084    (0.72)  -0.053    (-0.49) 
EX_OPTION× SCA   -0.007    (-0.72)  -0.046    (-0.92)   0.004     (0.87) 
EX_OPTION× SOX   -0.009    (-1.07)  -0.008    (-1.22)  -0.003    (-0.81) 
OWNER    0.094    (5.67)  0.099    (5.08)  -0.048   (-3.37) 
OWNER× SCA    0.004     (0.53)  0.008    (1.04)  0.001    (0.38) 
OWNER× SOX   -0.037  (-3.91)  -0.052    (-5.83)  -0.017   (-2.24) 
    
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.076    0.055 
F- value  (Pr > F)  157.87  (<0.0001) 172.69  (<0.0001) 156.42  (<0.0001) 
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Notes to Table 3: 
 
The dependent variable is either ABS_DA, Positive_DA or Negative_DA where ABS_DA is the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones Model, Positive_DA is the value of 
positive discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones model and Negative_DA is the value of 
negative discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones model; RM_PROXY is the sum of the 
standardized three real earnings management proxies, i.e., R_CFO, R_PROD and R_DISX;ΔGDP is the 
percent change in the real gross domestic product from the previous year; BIG is a dummy variable if the 
company is audited by a big 5 (4) auditor; MKTVAL is market value of equity; TIME is a trend variable 
equal to the difference between the current year of observation and 1987;  SCA is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the year of observation is in 2000 or 2001;  SOX is a dummy variable equal to one if the year of 
observation is in 2002, 2003, 2004 or 2005; BONUS is the average bonus compensation as a proportion of 
total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm; EX_OPTION is the number of unexercised 
options that the executive held at yearend that were vested scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPTION is the number of unexercised options (including options grants in the current period) that the 
executive held at yearend that had not vested scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. OWNER is the 
sum of restricted stock grants in the current period and the aggregate number of shares held by the 
executive at yearend (excluding stock options) scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
 
t-statistics are calculated using Huber-White standard errors. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Real Earnings Management Activities 
 1987 – 2005 
 
SOXOWNERSCAOWNEROWNER
SOXOPTIONEXSCAOPTIONEXOPTIONEX
SOXOPTIONUNSCAOPTIONUNOPTIONUN
SOXBONUSSCABONUSBONUSDAABS
SOXSCATimeMKTVALGDPBIGDEP
jjj
jjj
jjj
jjjj
jjjj
××+××+×+
××+××+×+
××+××+×+
××+××+×+×+
×+×+×+×+Δ×+×+=
191817
161514
131211
10987
6543210
___
___
_
 
ααα
ααα
ααα
αααα
ααααααα
 
 
R_CFO R_PROD 
 
R_DISX 
 
RM_PROXY 
 
Coeff.    (t-stat) Coeff.   (t-stat) Coeff.    (t-stat) Coeff.    (t-stat) 
Intercept  0.016  (3.21)  0.078  (9.41)  0.013  (5.92)  -0.046  (-3.21) 
BIG  -0.004  (-0.64)  -0.003  (-0.71)  -0.008  (-0.52)  -0.002  (-0.72) 
ΔGDP  -0.153 (-2.54)  -0.199  (-3.97)  -0.191  (-4.81)  -0.159  (-4.41) 
MKTVAL  -0.013  (-5.28)  -0.014  (-6.59)  0.005  (5.76)  -0.031  (-5.73) 
Time  -0.002  (-2.13)  -0.002  (-1.58)  0.004  (2.72)  -0.004  (-2.87) 
SCA  -0.006  (-1.14)  -0.015  (-1.81)  0.009  (3.71)  0.031  (3.15) 
SOX  0.007  (1.93)  0.039  (5.07)  -0.016  (-3.75)  0.032  (5.69) 
ABS_DA  -0.085  (-8.39)  -0.098  (-8.96)  -0.016  (-1.74)  -0.079  (-6.74) 
BONUS   -0.048  (-5.34)  -0.061  (-7.91)  -0.021  (-1.93)  -0.044  (-4.11) 
BONUS × SCA  .005  (0.92)  0.004  (0.58)  0.007  (1.06)  0.002  (0.87) 
BONUS × SOX  0.008  (1.17)  0.003  (0.76)  0.003  (0.72)  0.004  (0.76) 
UN_OPTION   -0.289 (-7.23)  -0.168  (-11.09)  -0.142 (-8.95)  -0.194  (-9.21) 
UN_OPTION × SCA  0.052  (2.81)  0.013  (1.87)  -0.008 (-0.83)  0.039 (1.68) 
UN_OPTION × SOX   0.126  (6.76)  0.074  (5.11)  -0.015  (-3.98)  0.093  (3.71) 
EX_OPTION  -0.169 (-1.46)  -0.069  (-0.56)  -0.073  (-0.59)  -0.134  (-0.53) 
EX_OPTION× SCA  -0.043  (-0.92)  -0.025  (-0.64)  -0.005  (-0.93)  -0.036  (-0.78) 
EX_OPTION× SOX  0.006  (0.55)  0.004  (0.32)  0.004 (0.31)  0.004  (0.39) 
OWNER  -0.241  (-3.93)  -0.281  (-2.92)  -0.148  (-2.65)  -0.175  (-2.77) 
OWNER× SCA  0.126  (2.19)  0.176  (2.74)  -0.043  (-2.36)  0.119  (2.59) 
OWNER× SOX  0.187 (4.69)  0.212 (3.27)  -0.009  (-1.95)  0.196 (3.29) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.618 0.716 0.737 0.774 
F- value    
(Pr > F)  
2692.69 
(<0.0001) 
2467.31 
(<0.0001) 
2528.17 
(<0.0001) 
2653.79 
(<0.0001) 
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Notes to Table 4: 
 
The dependent variable is either R_CFO, R_PROD, R_DISX or RM_PROXY where R_CFO represents the 
level of abnormal cash flows from operations, R_PROD represents the level of abnormal production costs, 
where production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventories and 
R_DISX represents the level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are the sum 
of advertising expenses, R&D expenses and SG&A expenses, and RM_PROXY is the sum of the 
standardized three real earnings management proxies, i.e., R_CFO, R_PROD and R_DISX; ΔGDP is the 
percent change in the real gross domestic product from the previous year; BIG is a dummy variable if the 
company is audited by a big 5 (4) auditor; MKTVAL is market value of equity; TIME is a trend variable 
equal to the difference between the year of observation and 1987;  SCA is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the year of observation is in 2000 or 2001;  SOX is a dummy variable equal to one if the year of observation 
is in 2002, 2003, 2004 or 2005; ABS_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals computed using the 
Modified Jones model; BONUS is the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation 
received by the CEO and CFO of the firm; EX_OPTION is the number of unexercised options that the 
executive held at yearend that were vested scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. UN_OPTION is 
the number of unexercised options (including options grants in the current period) that the executive held at 
yearend that had not vested scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. OWNER is the sum of restricted 
stock grants in the current period and the aggregate number of shares held by the executive at yearend 
(excluding stock options) scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
 
t-statistics are calculated using Huber-White standard errors. 
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Table 5, Panel A 
Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management 
Firms that “Just” Avoided Reporting Losses  
 
 Prior to SOX (1) 
After SOX 
(2) 
DIFFERENCE 
(1) – (2) 
DA 0.073 0.052 0.021*** 
RM_PROXY -0.114 0.010 -0.214*** 
 *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% 
 
 
Table 5, Panel B 
Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management 
Firms that Managed to Meet-or-Beat Last Year’s Net Income  
 
 Prior to SOX (1) 
After SOX 
(2) 
DIFFERENCE 
(1) – (2) 
DA 0.048 0.029 0.019*** 
RM_PROXY -0.103 0.004 -0.107*** 
 *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% 
 
 
Table 5, Panel C 
Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management 
Firms that Managed to just Meet or Beat Analyst Forecasts by a cent per share  
 
 Prior to SOX (1) 
After SOX 
(2) 
DIFFERENCE 
(1) – (2) 
DA 0.032 0.024 0.008** 
RM_PROXY -0.087 -0.034 -0.053*** 
 *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% 
 
 
Notes to Table 5: 
 
Panel A:  Firm-years “Just” avoiding reporting a loss are defined as firm-year observations where net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets lies in the interval [0, 0.005).  
 
Panel B: Firm-years that “Meet-or-Beat” last year’s net income are defined as firm-year observations where 
the change in net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets lies in the interval [0, 0.005). 
 
Panel C: Firm-years that “Meet or Beat” analyst forecasts by a cent per share or less. 
 
DA represents discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones model; RM_PROXY is the sum of 
the standardized three real earnings management proxies, i.e., R_CFO, R_PROD and R_DISX. 
 
